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I am very grateful to Fereidoon (Perry) Sioshansi for asking me to write a foreword to 
this excellent volume. Perry has done scholars of electricity reform a great service by 
drawing together another excellent collection of chapters on various aspects of reform 
in electricity markets across the world. Electricity liberalisation continues to be one of 
the longest running and most interesting set of multi-country micro-economic 
experiments. While most of these national experiments are on-going, some are mature 
enough to no longer be considered experiments, and many have been running long 
enough to give rise to preliminary results. Economic analysis is well served by well-
informed and detailed analyses of these experiments, such as appear in the pages of 
this book. 
 
In this brief foreword, I want to explore the issue of the balance between liberalisation 
and regulation in electricity systems, which is the essence of much of the detailed 
policies which are implemented in the sector (Pfaffenberger also raises the issue of 
this balance in his preface to this volume). By liberalisation I take to mean the use of 
market or quasi-market mechanisms as part of a reform of the sector, by regulation I 
take to mean intervention to restrain the operation of market prices or to set standards 
(e.g. for quality or system security) at variance with those that would otherwise have 
operated in the absence of regulation. I use the word ‘system’ rather than ‘market’ to 
indicate the extent of the system covered by a single regulator or system operator, 
which may or may not involve a market. Thus national or regional electricity systems 
and ISO areas would be included in what I mean by an electricity system. 
 
In looking at the issue of balance, let me say where I am coming from on this: 
 
First, liberalisation of electricity systems typically happens within a context of 
regulation. There is no such thing as complete deregulation of electricity markets, at 
least for systems of any significant size. Even among the leaders in global electricity 
liberalisation - UK, Texas or Norway - what we observe is a liberalisation process 
which has gone further than in many other jurisdictions but what this means is that the 
balance between liberalisation and regulation has been shifted further in favour of 
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liberalisation than elsewhere. Truly ‘private’ networks (e.g. in Woking in the UK (see 
London Energy Partnership, 2007)) or unregulated networks (e.g. in Mogadishu, 
within a failed state (see Nenova and Harford, 2004) can be observed but most 
systems are bigger than these. 
 
Second, the extent of liberalisation of electricity systems is a choice variable, 
generally  bounded by what might be possible. As has been amply demonstrated by 
the leading countries in electricity reform, there seems to be a lot of freedom to 
choose how much liberalisation to introduce. European countries in particular, at least 
initially, exhibited the full range of responses from virtually no change from a state 
vertically integrated monopoly to the creation of some of the most liberalised markets 
in the world. Among developing countries, Argentina and Chile exhibited substantial 
reform at an early stage while many more developed and developing countries have 
made less progress. 
 
Third, while liberalisation is a choice variable it is a variable conditioned by national 
institutional factors. Correlje and De Vries discuss this more fully in their chapter. 
Institutional factors do appear to constrain jurisdictions in their reform schemes. In 
general, only jurisdictions with substantial pro-competitive histories have attempted 
the most extensive set of reform measures. Arguably only Latin America provides any 
examples of extensive electricity reform within a tradition of state intervention – with 
Argentina being the most interesting example of this.  I will explore the extent to 
which reform choices may be constrained by wider institutional factors later in this 
chapter. 
 
Fourth, it is difficult for me not to write from a UK perspective. Although I am 
familiar with the reform experience in several jurisdictions, I naturally judge what 
might be possible on the basis of the experience which I have observed most closely. 
The advantage of doing this is that that UK has an honourable tradition of leading in 
the area of energy market reform, the disadvantage is obvious. Increasingly I am 
interested in thinking about why it is that so few of the jurisdictions that have 
attempted to replicate the UK experience have been successful. The explanations that 
naturally suggest themselves include (1) that reforms have not been extensive enough 
or (2) that a reform package that might be effective in the UK gives rise to perverse 
results elsewhere. Several US markets would seem to be examples of the former, 
whereas developing countries might suffer from the latter problem. A final more 
general explanation (3) might be that institutional constraints – particularly with 
respect to the initial ownership structure of the industry - mean that while UK style 
reforms are technically possible, they would not be implemented because of the 
political economy of the interest groups that exist in the countries concerned. Several 
major European countries, such as France, Spain and Germany would seem to in this 
category. For example, in France the starting point is a powerful and well regarded 
state owned company, while in Germany the starting point involves economically 
powerful private companies. 
 
I will continue by examining the case for liberalisation of electricity systems, then 
look at the case for regulation, offer a brief evaluation of what the evidence on where 
the balance might be drawn, before considering what the future might hold for 
electricity liberalisation. 
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The case for liberalisation 
 
As Chao, Oren and Wilson remind us in their chapter, the past for most electricity 
systems involved a high degree of vertical integration – particularly between 
generation and transmission, but also between distribution and retail and frequently 
between all four stages of production. The economic arguments for large vertically 
integrated electricity companies, which were significant in size within political 
jurisdictions rested on a claim that vertical economies were significant. Many studies 
examined the nature of these vertical economies and most, if not all, concluded that 
vertical economies between generation and transmission were significant (e.g. 
Kaserman and Mayo, 1991). This provided arguments for the integration of what we 
now know to be potentially competitive generation and monopoly transmission 
networks. Papers which claim vertical economies continue to be written, e.g. on the 
regional Japanese electric power companies where a very high degree of vertical 
integration continues to be significant (see Nemoto and Goto, 2004).  
 
Experience with liberalisation shows us that there were indeed costs to vertical 
separation, both in generation and transmission and between distribution and retail 
(see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997 and Domah and Pollitt, 2001). However these costs 
had to be incurred to achieve the benefits of more competition in generation and also 
more competition in retail. Studies showing vertical economies between the various 
stages of electricity supply are mostly not capable of modelling these benefits 
properly, and indeed in the case of studies where there are no non-integrated 
companies with whom performance of integrated utilities can be compared are 
seriously mis-specified. 
 
The case for competition in generation rests on the benefits of competitive markets 
generally. More precisely, a central claim is that competition drives efficiency gains, 
which can be substantial given that generation can be as much as 65% of value added 
in the sector. Efficiency gains are of two main types: cost savings arising from the 
more efficient operation of existing assets and those arising from the choice of 
cheaper technologies for new generation. Both can be significant, even more so where 
initial operation has been in the hands of inefficient publicly owned utilities. Heavily 
regulated integrated utilities are subject to a potential gold plating problem if they are 
privately owned (following Averch and Johnson, 1962) and subject to the pressure to 
be instruments of government industrial policy which supports expensive home grown 
contractors and designs, rather than generic scalable technologies which are available 
off the shelf (see Henderson, 1977 and Green, 1995 on the highly expensive British 
nuclear programmes). Clearly the uptake of CCGT in competitive generation has been 
a great success in liberalised electricity markets, as has the cutting of support for 
expensive untried clean coal technologies (which would not have been as clean as 
CCGT) and the curtailing of the uneconomic roll out of nuclear power (Newbery and 
Pollitt, 1997). Competitive generation has clearly revealed the price of different 
technologies and caused clear choices to be made in line with market principles. 
 
Electricity economists are keen to point out how different electricity is to other 
commodities and hence what some of the problems of letting the market operate 
might be. Indeed Chao, Oren and Wilson note that the regulatory compact in the US 
electricity sector was that monopoly operation of electricity networks was essentially 
the price that was paid by regulators in return for smoothing of retail electricity prices. 
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They suggest that electricity prices would be much more volatile in the absence of 
regulation and that this would be politically unacceptable. This is undoubtedly a 
powerful view of competition in retail electricity markets, which resonates today, 
even within the most fully liberalised markets. However it is a rather quaint given 
rising incomes and the increasing availability of sophisticated financial instruments. It 
may also be a view arising from US states where low power prices have been 
traditionally based on access to cheap coal (Joskow, 1997). Consumers in these states 
seem to have little to gain by deregulation and market extension to high price states. 
By contrast the enthusiastic advancement of market liberalisation in California was 
driven by high electricity prices in a state where demand was growing rapidly and 
there no cheap resources for power generation. Ambivalent views towards electricity 
reform are rather at odds with economists’ normal enthusiasm for market-determined 
prices. What full retail competition (i.e. including households) in both the UK, Nordic 
countries, New Zealand and Texas reveals is that consumers can be content to pay 
‘volatile’ electricity prices as long as there is a perceived benefit from retail 
competition. Undoubtedly the Chao et al. view does restrain regulators enthusiasm for 
proper retail competition in many US states and elsewhere. However it is based on the 
view that competition is ok in most markets, but somehow not ok in retail energy 
markets. This is rather odd, as economists (though not politicians) are happy to see 
volatile gasoline prices, but not volatile residential electricity (or natural gas?) prices. 
It is difficult to see how retail competition at the household level can make much 
progress in many jurisdictions unless this view faces serious challenge. 
 
At this point it is important to be clear about what full retail competition looks like in 
electricity markets. This is because what passes for retail competition in many US 
states is such a pale version of competition as to invite ridicule. Retail competition 
should involve the ability to switch electricity supplier. Effective retail competition 
would involve the existence of, say, five or more energy companies offering retail 
tariffs. If a customer switches from the incumbent supplier they would receive a bill 
from a different company who would purchase monopoly transmission and 
distribution services from incumbents but be responsible for billing, contract terms, 
bundling of other services and the purchase of wholesale power.  
 
In many US states this is not what is meant by ‘retail choice’. Retail choice simply 
involves buying the wholesale power component of one’s energy bill from a non-
incumbent. This eliminates competition in billing, bundling of other services and 
contract terms. This is an unusual type of competition, which is not the same as we 
observe in genuinely competitive markets. Such an odd version of what is meant by 
competition may not be a big issue where the wholesale power component is the most 
significant part of the bill (and may indeed by billed separately) and absolutely large 
(i.e. for large industrial customers). However the anti-competitive (pro-incumbent) 
situation is worst at the household level where US retail choice often involves the 
offering of default regulated tariffs to retail consumers which restrict switching by 
being regulated at a low level or having the property that if one switches, one cannot 
return to the default service tariff. The lesson from deregulated markets where there 
has been significant customer switching is that the existence of a low regulated retail 
tariff discourages switching i.e., there should be a removal of price regulation of retail 
tariffs. 
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The benefits of household retail competition continue to be debated (Littlechild, 2002, 
expresses the arguments for full retail competition, while Green and McDaniel, 1998, 
present a sceptical view). Retail competition has now been revealed to be an 
important complement to competition in generation. A major observation of 
electricity reforms is that monopoly networks are different businesses from the 
competitive businesses – generation and retail. The former are, when regulated 
effectively, low risk infrastructure businesses, while the latter are higher risk 
businesses subject to the normal bankruptcy risk faced by companies in competitive 
markets. While the vertical economies between generation and transmission are not 
sufficient to offset the benefits of competition in wholesale power markets, they do 
appear to be significant between generation and retail. In particular the risk 
management advantages of generation and retail integration are very important, such 
that stand-alone retail electricity companies have struggled. Across the world large 
stand-alone start-up retail companies have, after some initial successes, have generally 
failed, as exemplified by the experience of the UK, Netherlands and New Zealand. A 
notable retail-only business model, which has succeeded is that of the former 
incumbent gas company in the UK (Centrica) which has very successfully diversified 
into electricity retailing in the UK and in the rest of Europe. However this company 
has been born of an unusually competitive and unbundled gas industry in the UK. The 
good news is that competition in retail markets is possible; the bad news is that it is 
only likely to be as extensive as competition in generation because non-integrated 
retail companies have little chance of success at any reasonable scale. 
 
Economists are fond of pointing out the many other ways in which the detailed 
operation of the electricity market needs to be regulated. Thus there are issues to do 
with the efficient operation of the transmission system and the allocation of 
transmission capacity and the problems of incentivising enough generation capacity to 
be available to limit price spikes at peak times (see Singh, this volume). The 
liberalisation process has revealed that market and quasi-market mechanisms can 
address market and regulatory failures in these areas. PJM and some other 
jurisdictions, for example, have successfully implemented nodal pricing arrangements 
for the allocation of transmission capacity and many other markets have used price 
signals to make more efficient use of scarce transmission capacity.  
 
In terms of the mitigation of price spikes, special mechanisms have been introduced to 
pay generators to make extra capacity available, either more generally via a capacity 
payment (e.g. in the North East US), or specifically at the system peak (e.g. in the 
UK). While the long-term incentive properties of some of these mechanisms are 
dubious, they can mitigate short-term capacity shortage problems (this seems to be the 
case in New England) and provide comfort to regulators and politicians that 
something is being done to prevent the lights from going out. This view is supported 
by Adib, Schubert and Oren, in their chapter, who suggest that ‘there is no evidence’ 
that capacity support mechanisms actually promote investment in the long term. 
Moran and Skinner’s chapter on Australia, further suggests that a market without 
capacity payments can work well, even though prices do occasionally spike. However 
as long as these spike reduction measures are not too expensive, they may be a price 
worth paying for the continuation of electricity reforms elsewhere in the system. 
Indeed, Bowring’s chapter on PJM’s capacity markets suggests that they may have a 
limited role to play in reassuring stakeholders that adequate capacity will be available. 
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Bowring concludes that capacity markets are ‘not a panacea’ but can play ‘a critical 
but circumscribed role in wholesale power market design’ [my italics]. 
 
Generation and retail electricity markets yield major market advantages over vertical 
integration. First, they allow the efficient handling of business risk. There are 
substantial uncertainties in the short, medium and long term in power markets. 
Markets are good at handling these types of risk. Indeed given the capacity of the oil 
market to handle much more significant risks, it would be odd if we did not leave 
these to the market in electricity. 
 
Second, price has a significant role to play in ensuring security of electricity supply. 
The old vertical integrated system did provide security of supply – at a cost. Most 
markets allow a significant role for the price in ensuring security of supply. Around 
the market price insurance can be offered to those who want it, while those who want 
to self-insure can opt out. As the UK (2004-06), New Zealand (2001), Nordic 
countries (2002-03) and Chile (1998-99) have all demonstrated in recent years, retail 
electricity customers are willing to be exposed to significant price volatility and  play 
a significant role in demand management. 
 
Third, full retail competition offers a significant political advantage over vertical 
integration: the ‘privatisation’ of the final price of electricity. Where retail prices 
continue to be regulated, as they are in the absence of full retail competition or the 
continuation of a default service tariff, political or regulatory interference is much 
more likely. This is important at times of rising energy commodity prices, when the 
pressure will be to slow the translation of these into higher retail prices. Between 
2004 and 2006, wholesale gas prices quadrupled in the UK and retail electricity and 
gas prices rose significantly. However the most common response to this sharp rise 
was for politicians to point out that most electricity and gas consumers could cut their 
energy bills by switching to a cheaper energy supplier. In the absence of retail 
competition the pressure for politicians’ intervention would be much stronger than 
this. Continuation of regulation of the final price of electricity is usually a sign of 
insufficient competition in the wholesale power market. Removing such regulation 
focuses regulators attention on making the power market competitive. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the EU Energy Sector Inquiry, where advent of full retail 
competition at the household level has led the European Commission to focus on the 
removal of barriers to competition in wholesale power markets. 
 
Fourth, competition promotes innovation, some of which may be unexpected. Retail 
competition in electricity markets has promoted joint marketing of electricity and gas 
where these were previously often provided by different local monopolies, the use of 
internet-based switching sites, payment by direct debit and the vertical integration of 
generation and retail (in jurisdictions where this did not previously exist). We have 
already noted the effect that competition in generation has had on the adoption of 
generation technologies. However it has also led to the refurbishment of assets, rather 
than their replacement (or originally scheduled closure). For example, the widespread 
life extension of the US nuclear fleet (where no plants have shut down since 1998 and 
where the majority seem set to be life-extended to 2035 and beyond) is something that 
is clearly incentivised by competition in generation (see Joskow, 2006a). 
 
The case for regulation 
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Even in the leading utility reform sector – telecoms - regulators have been slow to 
remove regulated retail and access tariffs to  networks for competitive telecom service 
providers. Thus we might expect there to continue to be a strong pressure for 
continued regulation in the electricity sector.  
 
Demsetz (1968) asked the question: why regulate utilities? He pointed out that while 
natural monopoly might still exist, it could be restrained by franchising or competition 
for the field in utility sectors, such as electricity. In New Zealand, as Bertram (2006) 
discussed in this book’s predecessor volume, the government conducted a rather 
interesting economic experiment. They left the regulation of the operation of the 
electricity distribution businesses to general competition policy. This resulted in the 
lines businesses significantly increasing their charges relative to costs and absorbing 
all of the benefits of competition in generation and retail (see Figure 1). This 
experiment graphically demonstrates the fact that electricity networks do have 
significant market power and need to be formally price regulated. It also provides a 
good argument for an effective sector specific regulator formally charged with 
implementing a price review process in networks, even in jurisdictions with 
competent general competition authorities. 
 
Figure 1 
New Zealand Residential Electricity Price c/kWh (2000 NZ$) 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development (2000). 
 
 
 
Regulation of the average prices or revenue of natural monopoly networks is not 
enough to ensure that network owners do not abuse their monopoly power in 
situations where there continues to be vertical integration of electricity networks with 
either generation or retail businesses. As the experience with telecoms deregulation 
shows, there is a need for the regulation of access to monopoly networks for 
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generators trying to reach customers and retailers trying to source power (see 
Bergman et al., 1998 on telecoms). Such access pricing needs to ensure that the 
incumbent network asset owners can secure a return to their investment and that 
switching to non-incumbents occurs simply on the basis of differences in costs, prices 
and service offerings in the competitive parts of the supply chain.  
 
In the case of telecoms, the efficient component pricing rule (Baumol et al., 1997) 
attempted to limit inefficient bypass of the incumbent’s assets in the competitive 
segment in conditions where the final price was regulated. In electricity, the problem 
of access pricing involves clear non-discrimination in the allocation of network access 
and the regulation of tariffs to reflect the true costs of the monopoly network. In 
general, energy regulators have been able to do this where their powers have been 
sufficient, though in some continental European countries, such as Germany, there 
have been  substantial problems reported by non-incumbent generators trying to get 
access terms in the early years of restructuring (see Bergman et al., 1999).  
 
In retail, there have been examples of incumbent retailers integrated with distribution 
wires attempting to allocate an overly generous part of the initially shared assets to the 
monopoly distribution wires business and hence raising access charges for non-
incumbent retailers. This effectively means that the retail customers who switch to 
non-incumbents subsidise the retail part of an incumbent’s business. The potential 
size of this cost allocation problem is substantial. The UK electricity regulator, 
Ofgem, reallocated an amount equivalent to around 18% (of which a third was 
metering costs) of the controllable cost of regulated distribution from distribution 
wires to retail in 2000 (see Ofgem, 1999, p.17). This reflected the misallocation of 
assets and costs within incumbent integrated distribution and retail companies at the 
time the market was opened to full retail competition.  
 
The appropriate regulation of access charges and terms continues to drive the debate 
over unbundling of network assets in Europe. Successive European electricity 
directives in 1996 and 2003 have mandated increasingly tough unbundling 
requirements between the network and competitive businesses within integrated 
companies. The recent EU Energy Sector Enquiry highlighted access problems as a 
major barrier to the advancement of competition in European electricity and gas 
markets (European Commission, 2007). In mid-2007, the European Commission is 
pressing for full ownership unbundling of gas and electricity transmission networks 
from the rest of the system. This has been proposed to finally remove the incentive on 
transmission owners to favour their own generation or to not propose transmission 
investments, which would bring system benefits at the expense of corporate profits in 
generation. It remains to be seen whether the Commission will eventually force 
ownership unbundling of just system operation along an ISO model (such as PJM) or 
will also require the ownership unbundling of transmission assets to create 
independent TSOs (such as in the UK or under the stalled RTO model in the US). The 
weaker ISO model option may prevail as a compromise with countries for whom 
ownership unbundling of transmission assets is politically unacceptable. ISOs without 
transmission assets may do well on non-discrimination but do not solve the problem 
of under-investment in transmission by companies with market power in generation. 
Singh discusses the problems in US transmission in his chapter, putting emphasis on 
the need to improve transmission investment incentives and the fact that the debate in 
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the US has begun to focus on the case for independent transmission companies as 
opposed to ISOs. 
 
Regulation is also important in a number of non-price areas: for example, standards 
for quality of service, reliability and network losses. Unless regulators enforce some 
sort of penalty price for the non-delivery of minimum standards, there may be 
incentives for services to deteriorate or not optimally improve the quality of the 
operation of the network. A good example of this follows. Distribution losses are paid 
for by retail customers who must buy extra power to cover network losses. Network 
losses are assumed, for charging purposes, to be uniform and constant in most 
distribution networks. Hence there is little advantage for competitive suppliers 
seeking to minimise these, resulting in market failure. In the UK, network losses in 
distribution did not change much over the first ten years following liberalisation, until 
the regulator introduced a tougher financial penalty for distribution losses payable by 
network owners (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). This led to a sharp and immediate cut 
in distribution losses as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Distribution losses in the UK as percentage of energy delivered 
Source: Jamasb and Pollitt (2007). 
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The creation of competitive wholesale markets has been associated with the need to 
create appropriate transmission access regimes. However the rise of distributed 
generation (embedded within the distribution network), in response to technological 
change and climate change concerns, has necessitated a more considered regulatory 
approach to the regulation of distribution access. This is pressurising regulators to 
develop more flexible access terms for distributed generation within the distribution 
network, which reflect its true value to the system. The regulatory issues raised by 
distributed generation are discussed in the chapter by Bauknecht and Brunekreeft. 
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It is important to note that there has been a significant improvement in the 
sophistication of regulation of natural monopolies since electricity reform began. The 
Averch-Johnson effect, the theory of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971) and distortions 
of regulated price differentials (Peltzman, 1976), not to mention the rather 
unimpressive early attempts at limited (and hence distortionary) incentive regulation 
(Berg and Jeong, 1991) are lessons that now seem to be well learned by the best 
regulatory agencies operating in competitive markets. Indeed there does seem to be a 
rather clear positive correlation between the degree of development of liberalisation 
and the quality of the regulatory agency (see Green et al, 2005). Particular progress 
has been made in the incentive regulation of electricity networks, where sophisticated 
analysis has been combined with the use of fixed term price controls, which 
incentivise cost reduction (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001 and Joskow, 2005). Indeed an 
obvious potential gain from unbundling electricity networks from the rest of the 
supply chain is the facilitation of superior regulation of network businesses. This can 
lead to significant cuts in regulated tariffs and / or increases in investment, as 
exemplified by  the experience of the UK, Nordic countries, Chile and New South 
Wales. Effective regulation not only brings direct benefits through more efficient 
networks but also through the facilitation of wholesale and retail competition across 
these networks. 
 
While the regulation of electricity networks is clearly necessary, electricity market 
liberalisation has thrown up a strong case for market monitoring (as detailed in the 
chapter by Adib, Hurlbut and Jaussaud) of the operation of the competition within 
generation and retail markets. Market monitoring requires vigilance and quick action 
to correct market rules if societal welfare is to be maximised (or not significantly 
reduced). Specialist energy regulators seem best able to analyse market data and to 
propose remedies, with detailed market rule changes  sometimes delegated to system 
operators or wholesale market governance mechanisms if sufficient regulatory threat 
is in place. The need for regulatory oversight of this type would seem to be more 
necessary in the early stages of market redesign due to the complexity and scope for 
gaming which exists in electricity markets. However over time regulatory oversight 
may be reduced as market operators become more able to self-regulate. A parallel 
might be drawn with financial markets in this respect where effective self-regulation 
may be generally desirable within a context of appropriate legal protection and the 
operation of the general competition authority. 
 
Electricity markets may need to be redesigned from time to time with significant 
regulatory involvement (in assessing the relative merits of different designs) as new 
analysis on optimal market design comes to light. An example of such a design 
question is raised in the chapter by Sioshansi, Oren and O’Neill who examine the 
relative merits of central versus self-commitment of generation units. They come 
down in favour of central commitment rather than self-commitment. Self-commitment 
was a significant element of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements for wholesale 
power which replaced the Pool (begun in 1990) in England and Wales in 2001. In 
their chapter O’Neill and Hobbs consider the lessons from different auction markets 
in the US for wholesale energy and ancillary services. All such significant redesigns 
need careful assessment in order to avoid imposing additional costs on electricity 
customers. 
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Particular problems have been noted with the utilisation of interconnectors between 
jurisdictions, price signalling within power pools, withholding of capacity and 
mergers between energy companies. Interconnectors are a particular issue within the 
transmission system because they can be closely monitored. What seems to be the 
case, is that these can be often congested, flowing in a perverse direction and not 
subject to appropriate capacity upgrading. In Europe, international electricity and gas 
interconnectors are the subject of scrutiny of regulators (see European Commission, 
2007) to detect the operation of market power by integrated incumbents. Gas 
interconnector utilisation (or the lack of it) and non-responsiveness to large 
international price differentials have been particularly noted. Power pools and 
organised power markets can be subject to price manipulation. This is because of the 
repeated game nature of such interaction and the ability of firms to signal to one 
another within the power pool. Such accusations were regularly made of firms in the 
early days of power pool in the UK. Indeed when the regulator imposed a price cap on 
the incumbents in this market, they managed to hit it exactly (see Newbery, 2006).  
 
California’s ill-fated power markets are still under investigation for the alleged 
withholding of capacity to drive up prices (see Sweeney, 2006). Measures of the 
residual market power index clearly show that in many power markets incumbents 
have the ability to withhold enough capacity to drive up the price significantly.  
 
Finally, power company mergers require careful assessment. This is because the sheer 
volume of transactions among energy companies brought about by liberalisation has 
the capacity to rapidly change the shape of the power sector (see Codognet et al., 
2002). The increase in effective market size brought about by liberalisation in many 
US and European markets, requires mergers to be evaluated more carefully than 
would have been the case in the past. In Europe, the concentration of ownership at the 
European level has been the price paid to reduce concentration within individual 
national markets (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). Meanwhile mergers between 
electricity and gas companies have created the potential for the sophisticated exercise 
of market power in the interrelation between gas and electricity markets. The highly 
controversial merger between EON and Ruhrgas in 2003 integrated the major supplier 
of wholesale gas and one of the major energy companies in Germany, eliminating a 
major potential competitor in the electricity market. This merger was opposed by the 
German competition authority but approved by the government. A similar merger 
between Endesa and Gas Natural in Spain in 2006 was initially approved but failed to 
occur. 
 
It is important to stress that while liberalisation has involved some reduction in 
regulation in wholesale and retail electricity, it is not necessarily the case that 
liberalisation and regulation are substitutes. Wholesale and retail competition may 
require more regulation (in terms of cost and complexity) to ensure their success. A 
state owned vertically integrated national monopoly may require minimal regulation, 
but is not consistent with a liberalised market. 
 
Evaluating the experience with electricity market reform 
 
Globally, the evidence on the success of electricity reform is surprisingly mixed. One 
would have expected to find clear evidence of reform success showing up by now in 
the econometric evidence. This is however difficult to demonstrate as Jamasb et al. 
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(2004) show. There are only two econometric studies of the price effects of electricity 
reform in the OECD (Steiner, 2001 and Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004). Both show some 
weak evidence of lower prices in the period to 1999, but it is difficult to distinguish 
which reform steps may be contributing to this. The evidence for developing countries 
is even more difficult. There is support for the view that incentive regulation, with 
privatisation and wholesale competition does raise investment, reduce losses and 
lower prices. However the precise interaction between reform steps is somewhat 
complex. The picture is complicated somewhat because pre-reform prices may have 
been artificially low relative to economic levels. Successful reform in these cases 
involves raising the price or simply holding prices constant while efficiency is 
increased. 
 
Part of the problem is that the success of electricity liberalisation might be measured 
on several dimensions, for example, price, quality of service, losses and investment, 
and may need several years of observation before a trend improvement is apparent 
(given ‘normal’ year to year volatility). In recent years high commodity prices for gas 
further cloud the picture. Another problem is a lack of careful cost benefit analyses of 
reforms in particular jurisdictions where the counterfactual has been clearly worked 
out and is defensible. The basic assumption that variables of interest would have been 
same as before in the absence of liberalisation may not be the right one. Indeed in 
many cases, the liberalisation may have resulted in some variables (e.g. price) rising 
less rapidly or indeed falling less rapidly, than would otherwise have been case.  
 
A promising way forward is to make a list of where one might think there has been a 
successful electricity reform. A good start would be to look at the chapters of 
Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006). Among developing and transition countries 
Argentina and Chile stand out as successful poster cases. After this, the list becomes 
quite thin with perhaps, Peru and Columbia as additional cases. In many others there 
have been significant problems (e.g. Brazil: as discussed by Araujo, Correia, Costa 
and Melo in their chapter in this volume), and yet others not a lot has yet been tried 
(e.g. Middle East, Africa, parts of India). Among developed countries, there has been 
a lot of reform impetus. The EU has attempted a major organised reform programme 
but only the UK, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands can really be said to 
be making significant progress from the pre-reform model. In most other European 
countries demonstrating a positive impact from electricity reforms and indeed much 
real enthusiasm beyond that generated by wishing to be good European citizens in 
complying with the Directives is difficult.  
 
In North America, Texas, PJM, New England and New York demonstrate good 
progress in wholesale competition, but only Texas and some odd bits of Maine, 
Pennsylvania and Ohio have retail choice, while many states exhibit no progress from 
the traditional vertically integrated model. In Maine, Pennsylvania and Ohio regulated 
retail tariffs continue to limit competition and ‘choice’ is simply in the generation part 
of the retail bill. In Ohio one incumbent company discourages switching by 
highlighting consumer’s right to choose not to release data to alternative energy 
suppliers (on privacy grounds). Australia and New Zealand have shown enthusiasm 
for reform but significant problems remain in several Australian states (e.g. 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia where only partial liberalisation has 
occurred), though good retail competition is developing in Victoria and South 
Australia (see Moran and Skinner, this volume, on Australia). In New Zealand there 
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have been a number of legislative attempts to progress reform in the face of setbacks. 
In Japan progress with electricity reform continues to move very slowly. 
 
Overall the picture is one of significant progress towards the maximum possible 
electricity reform being made in only a handful of jurisdictions, while reform progress 
has stalled at some intermediate stage in many more jurisdictions. Even some of the 
places where we think of the most progress as being made: parts of PJM, as well as 
Chile and Argentina have not got full retail competition. 
 
Correlje and De Vries suggest that, it is difficult to come up with clear lessons from 
electricity reforms which translate globally because of what they call physical, 
economic and institutional factors. However there are some lessons: 
 
First, ownership unbundling of electricity transmission from the rest of the electricity 
network has produced clear benefits in the markets where it has been tried in terms of 
improving access conditions for competitive generation and removing incentives to 
under-invest in transmission. ISOs with continued integration of transmission and 
generation are largely effective in improving access conditions and the operation of 
the transmission system but suffer significantly from continuing under investment; 
Chile being an excellent example of this, among others (see Pollitt, 2004). 
 
Second, getting market structure right in electricity generation is crucial for the 
success of electricity reform. This involves sufficient divestiture to, say, five  players 
by incumbents. Relying on new entry alone will not be enough to ensure the reduction 
in the market power of incumbents. Where regulators have been unable to introduce 
low concentration at the opening of new power markets, they have faced an uphill 
battle to reduce concentration. Really successful wholesale power markets either 
introduced competition right at the start e.g., in Argentina, PJM, Texas or undertook 
significant regulatory intervention subsequently, e.g., in UK. 
 
Third, incentive regulation based on RPI-X price control of monopoly networks can 
deliver significant incentives to reduce costs and can facilitate efficient operation with 
the provision of stable cash flow for new investment. Regulators that have not made 
best use of incentive regulation have missed out on a substantial part of the gains from 
ending of the vertical monopoly in electricity. This is clear from a glance at the 
division of the final price of electricity between generation, transmission, distribution 
and retail elements in European countries. The countries with tougher incentive 
regulation of networks have significantly lower network costs than those who do not 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
 
Fourth, regulation can address market failures in electricity markets such as those 
associated with quality of supply. The problem with regulatory incentives to meet 
non-price objectives is that they may interact with one another and create perverse 
incentives. Regulators need to understand the power of incentives both to solve 
perceived problems in electricity systems and to inadvertently incentivise welfare 
reducing activity. Indeed part of the problem of electricity liberalisation is that it 
requires more sophisticated regulation to be successful.  
 
Overall the potential benefits of electricity reform seem to be positive. Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997) conservatively estimated that generation and transmission reform in the 
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UK reduced costs permanently by 5%. Fabrizio et al. (2006) come up with a similar 
figure for the reduction in generation costs due to reforms in the US. Looking at final 
electricity prices in the US, Joskow (2006b) finds that competitive wholesale markets 
and retail competition have reduced prices (relative to their absence) significantly, 
with retail competition reducing prices by 5-10% for residential customers and 5% for 
industrial customers. Focussing on just the New England wholesale power market, 
Barmack et al. (2007) find a net gain of 2% of costs due to reforms. In distribution 
and retail, the benefits are similar in order of magnitude. Domah and Pollitt (2001) 
identified gains of around 10% of costs for the UK. For developing countries, Toba 
(2003) estimated that the liberalisation of Philippine electricity generation produced a 
one-off gain equivalent to around 10% of GDP, while Mota (2003) estimated that the 
privatisation (and incentive regulation) of Brazilian electricity distribution produced a 
one-off gain of more than 2% of GDP. 
 
Stephen Littlechild (2000) helpfully breaks down the benefit of the early years of the 
UK reforms in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sources of price reduction to domestic users 1991/92-1998/9 
(Source: Littlechild, 2000) 
 
Source % 
Lower generation costs 10 
Lower distribution and transmission charges 9 
Lower supply business margin 1 
Lower fossil fuel levy (mainly to fund nuclear liabilities) 9 
 
Total 
 
29 
 
 
Littlechild’s analysis helpfully focuses on residential customers and provides a point 
estimate of the impact of reform (in contrast to the NPV calculations of the Newbery 
and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and Pollitt (2001) studies). This indicates that the 
reduction in residential prices is split almost equally between lower generation costs 
(operating efficiency and fuel switching), lower distribution and transmission charges 
(transferred to consumers via RPI-X) and a lower fossil fuel levy, which was the 
subsidy to the nuclear sector to cover un-financed decommissioning liabilities (the 
ending of an industrial subsidy). Thus one might say that gains were coming from 
competition, improved economic regulation and the elimination of inefficient 
industrial subsidies to energy production. This highlights the fact that in many 
countries a clear benefit of liberalisation is likely to be the end of expensive industrial 
policies towards the energy sector or at the very least increase the transparency of the 
cost of these. 
 
The future of electricity liberalisation 
 
Electricity reform around the world has been driven by a combination of the success 
of the early reformers (who inspired many followers) and the extensive reform 
programs at the federal level in the US and at the level of the European Commission 
in Europe. As the difficulty of replicating the success of the early reformers has 
become more apparent, particularly in developing countries, and as the US federal 
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program has stalled, many jurisdictions have failed to pursue electricity liberalisation 
to its logical conclusion. Only in the EU has the sustained commitment of the 
European Commission within a wider single market agenda (which encompasses all 
industrial sectors) and a political system where energy reforms can become part of the 
international bargaining process has the pressure for further electricity market reforms 
been sustained. However, Cornwall’s chapter highlights just how far there is to go to 
establish regional electricity markets (covering groups of neighbouring countries) in 
Europe, let alone to the Commission’s goal of a single electricity market in Europe. 
 
What is becoming increasingly clear is that electricity reform has failed to convince 
many of its merits (e.g. Thomas, 2006). On the basis of the evidence of the delivery of 
clear benefits being somewhat mixed, this is hardly surprising. What seems to be the 
case is that the pursuit of electricity reform through to its logical conclusion is only 
likely to happen in jurisdictions where there is a strong ideological commitment to 
competition in energy markets. This will partly be driven by resource conditions – the 
presence of initially high costs with scope for efficiency gains is conducive to reform 
– but significantly by whether there is a fundamental belief that electricity prices 
should be left to the market. This belief is partly a belief in the market itself and partly 
a belief in the market for energy per se.  
 
Some who believe in the market still think energy markets sufficiently different from 
others to warrant the sort of intervention that prevents the emergence of effective 
competition in generation and / or in retail. Often this reflects (or is supported by) 
concerns about security of supply and increasingly concerns about pollution from 
electricity production. What is absolutely clear is that successful through-going 
electricity liberalisation requires both a belief in competition and effective institutions 
of competition policy. Countries, such as France and Germany, will struggle to make 
serious progress with electricity reform unless they can change their attitude to 
competition in the electricity sector. This is not beyond the bounds of possibility but it 
will require the sort of reluctant change in attitude, which globalisation and 
technological change has brought about in other sectors (such as telecoms). 
 
A new and important challenge to electricity reform is posed by climate change. As 
Ford discusses in his chapter, climate change is a serious issue which the power sector 
will be expected to address. Economically sensible policies for the internalisation of 
the external costs of CO2 emissions have been enacted in the EU (as the EU 
Emissions Trading System) and proposed in the US (various state and regional trading 
initiatives are progressing, with a bill for a national scheme being put before the 
Senate in 2003). However, with regard to the balance of liberalisation and regulation 
in electricity systems, climate change is a potential vehicle for the return of old-style 
intervention in electricity generation and in retail competition. The argument will be 
that the market will not invest in low carbon generation without long-term contracts 
for low carbon electricity generation. Such contracts would effectively eliminate 
competition in the wholesale power market. On the retail side, the argument will be 
that consumers who switch, fail to provide long-term incentives for micro-power and 
demand side management (DSM) investments. Regulators face a significant challenge 
if they are to introduce subsidies to low carbon electricity generation which do not 
effectively end competition. Clearly environmental externalities should be priced 
properly as a first step. Competition should be viewed as part of solution, not the 
problem. Encouraging price sensitivity and consumer selection between own 
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generation, DSM measures and energy supplier would be a more effective way of 
mobilising extra resources (from customers) and cheaper market led responses for 
tackling climate change than potentially highly expensive centrally imposed 
investments. The potential for DSM in liberalised market environments is taken up in 
the chapter by Zarnikau. 
 
In the context of rising political concern about climate change, we need to heed the 
lessons of history on the poor track record of government backed technologies in 
energy. Cohen and Noll (1991) highlight the ‘technology pork barrel’ in the US and 
the difficulty of ceasing government funding of energy technologies which fail to 
deliver. Fri (2003) suggests that although the theoretical case for public funding (or 
consumer subsidy) of energy R&D is compelling, the track record suggests that the 
situations where intervention is likely to have positive net present value are rather 
limited. He also makes the interesting observation that subsidies for strategic 
deployment to exploit learning economies have been of dubious economic value as 
learning has been just as rapid in non-subsidised ‘mature’ technologies. Most 
successful innovation in electricity systems is incremental (Fri, 2003) and best left to 
the forces of the competition, attempts to force the pace by subsidy are likely to be 
expensive mistakes (especially in aggregate across the portfolio range of 
technological interventions). By contrast the introduction of market based incentives 
to abate environmental pollution in electricity have an excellent track record. The US 
SO2 cap and trade programme being the most notably successful of these (see 
Ellerman and Dubroeucq, 2004). In this context it is vital that we properly evaluate 
the success of the various renewable electricity support schemes implemented around 
the world (as for example in the chapter by Haas et al.), while continuing to press for 
the establishment of a sensibly high trading price for CO2. Once this price established 
the requirement for large and potentially wasteful subsides to support the roll out of 
renewable capacity will be substantially reduced. 
 
Liberalised electricity markets have had a good run where they have been 
implemented.  The US, UK, New Zealand, Australia and Scandinavia initially had 
very favourable generation capacity reserve margins, well developed transmission and 
distribution networks and a favourable fuel price environment. This facilitated 
electricity reform by allowing for a significant period of uncertainty and learning 
where little net new investment was necessary. (Though in many of the early 
reformers there was significant new investment – Chile and Argentina being the most 
striking examples in terms of demand growth). However the investment demands, 
even on mature networks are now increasing as networks require replacement (or 
refurbishment) and significant new generation investments are required given the 
investment cycle. This will test the investment incentive structure in these markets 
(and will test government commitment to leaving investments to the market). In 
networks, new mechanisms need to be developed for incentivising least cost 
investments rather than simply incentivising efficient operation (as under RPI-X). 
Innovative new schemes for the selection of new investments have been successfully 
tried out – such as the public contest method for new transmission investments in 
Argentina which involved users voting for whether they wanted new lines (Littlechild 
and Skerk, 2004). Competitive tendering, even for investments within meshed 
networks, could be extended with the tender price being incorporated in the regulatory 
asset base.  
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Correlje and De Vries bring us back to the consistency of electricity reforms with 
underlying institutional determinants as well as physical and economic factors. This is 
in line with recent work being done on the determinants of economic growth by La 
Porta et al. (1999) and the strength of financial systems by Bordo (2006). It seems 
clear that the detailed electricity system reform needs to be consistent with the 
institutional framework within which the reforms take place. Starting points are 
important: significant public ownership and prices which more than cover efficient 
economic cost greatly facilitate a structural reform which will yield positive social 
welfare. These starting points were present in Chile, Argentina, UK, Australia and 
New Zealand. Initial private ownership (e.g. in the US, Japan and Germany) and 
prices below economic cost (e.g. in India) make reform much more difficult. 
Electricity reforms are complex and require a commitment to competition and 
efficient regulation. Significantly they also need to show flexibility to emerging 
information and allow scope for mid-course adjustments. It seems clear that a 
jurisdiction like the UK is very well suited to delivering a successful electricity 
reform at both the generation, network and retail levels. This is because the UK has a 
strong central state capable of encouraging private sector compliance under threat of 
legislation, a deep commitment to competition and liberalised final prices, a tradition 
of independent regulation and a significant capacity for institutional learning. Part of 
the problem faced by other jurisdictions is that some of the elements of the required 
institutional capability are not present and hence severely limit the capacity of the 
society to deliver a successful electricity reform. Another way of putting this, is to say 
that what we might call the Standard Reform Design as followed by the UK, Texas 
etc is a model with an institutional ‘fit’ appropriate to those jurisdictions. Of course 
this is not to say that for a given jurisdiction an alternative and potentially equally 
successful model, more in keeping with the institutional environment, does not exist. 
It is merely to say that Standard Reform Design to which the EU and the other 
reforming states are implicitly working will not be appropriate in many, if not most, 
jurisdictions. It is however worth pointing out that the UK’s (and one suspects, that of 
most other reforming states) institutional capabilities in the area of recent electricity 
reforms have been recently acquired and have not always been present. That said, it is 
true that a striking conclusion from a comprehensive survey of the electricity 
deregulation process in the UK is how impressive the British civil service was in 
designing and implementing a comprehensive reform, from scratch, in less than two 
years (Henney, 1994). 
 
To come full circle: I think there is an appropriate balancing of liberalisation and 
appropriate regulation in a given electricity system. However I think that the leading 
jurisdictions in electricity reform challenge everyone else to justify why reform ought 
not to be extended into areas previously thought to be unsuited to competition. This 
challenge seems particularly appropriate in the US where the contrast between leaders 
and laggards in reform seems marked and without much institutional logic (in the La 
Porta et al. and Bordo sense), though one can undoubtedly come up with theories to 
explain them (the Joskow, 1997, discussion of reform attitude and pre-reform price 
being the most economically satisfying). In other countries however the argument for 
the balance to be set in different places becomes easier to justify on the basis of 
differences in institutional capability. The challenge posed by this is then to improve 
institutional capability in order to exploit the possible gains from electricity 
liberalisation. The real prize for proceeding with this is an electricity system capable 
of fully harnessing the power of competitive forces to respond to an uncertain future 
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for the world’s energy markets in the face of environmental, technological and 
geopolitical challenges. 
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